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7 April 1965 *B*

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WEEKLY REPORT

THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Situation in the Congo

(Information as of 1700 EST 6 April)

SUMMARY

Rebel resistance in the northeast is crumbling rapidly, and government columns are setting out to pursue the survivors. While their northeastern "empire" fell apart last week, the rebel leaders were in Cairo, fighting over the debris. The radical Africans continue their plans--now seemingly quixotic--to keep up the flow of arms to the rebels via the Sudan. The focus of the rebellion is shifting south, to the Fizi salient, where the insurgents are on the offensive to capture Uvira and Albertville. On Lake Tanganyika's opposite shore, arms appear to be piling up in Tanzania as rebel sympathizers await the outcome of the Fizi-based attacks.

A separate memorandum concerning Tanzanian aid to the Congo rebels is attached.

1. Military Situation

The rebellion in the northeast is breaking up. Scattered insurgent bands still exist, but the bulk of the population is tired of rebels and rebellion, and in some cases the local people are even offering to help the government against rebel remnants.

A US Embassy officer who on 1 April visited Faradje and Watsa--taken by government troops two or three days earlier--noted that most of the inhabitants of the two towns had already returned, that the security situation "seemed good," and that no rebel activity was apparent. The people of Watsa, he said, were "thoroughly fed up with the rebels," who apparently had faded into the bush. The countryside thereabouts is said to be a difficult area in which to gather food, so it seems unlikely that insurgents nearby will be able to maintain their military formations for long.

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North of Paulis, the population is also said to have turned against the rebels. On 3 April a local chief appealed to a visiting US Army officer for black powder (to charge muzzle-loading muskets) so that he could arm his warriors "to fight the rebels."

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Stanleyville continues quiet, although much of its garrison has been moved elsewhere to reinforce distant posts. As of 5 April, however, over 100 mercenaries, probably enough to repel any conceivable rebel attack, were in the city. A large river boat convoy is due in Stanleyville soon. The regions west of the city as far as Coquilhatville are reported quiet for the first time in several months.

The area in the Congo where rebels are most active continues to be around the periphery of the Fizi salient, which borders Lake Tanganyika. Uvira, on the Burundi border, has been under rebel "attack" since 2 April. The insurgents undoubtedly hope to capture the town in order to reopen access to arms via Burundi. The government plans to send a 22-man mercenary platoon to defend the town, but there is still no word on whether this has been done.

South of Fizi, insurgent bands are advancing in the direction of Albertville. On 5 April, they are said to have attacked a government position 60 miles north of the city. Local Congolese Army commanders are increasing their calls for reinforcements and air support.

The Congolese naval patrol on Lake Tanganyika--a collection of lake steamers, trawlers, and speedboats--continues to operate. One participating ship captain claimed "good hunting" last week, but no specific reports are available on the number or size of smuggling vessels recently sunk.

2. The Rebels and their Sympathizers

While, to the relief of local tribesmen, insurgent bands were dispersing throughout the Congo's northeast, the captains of the rebellion were bickering

Personality clashes were almost certainly behind many of the disagreements. President Gbenye, Egide Bocheley-Davidson, Gaston Soumialot,

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and Vital Pakassa--all of whom at one time or another have been at each others' throats--were in the general vicinity of Cairo. Gbenye is now said to have left town in order to return "to the front." Foreign Minister Kanza is still in Nairobi, trumpeting rebel victories.

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At the same time, the Sudan Army is reported to be increasingly reluctant to let arms approach the Congo border. The army fears additional arms will fall into the hands of southern Sudanese dissidents.

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Because of the difficulties of sending weapons to the rebels by way of the Sudan and Uganda, the Tanzanian route is taking on greater importance. The Congolese lake patrol has made smuggling over water perilous, so now Burundi may be the key. To

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open access through Burundi would require two developments: (1) rebel control of Uvira, now held by government forces and (2) re-establishment of a pro-rebel regime in Bujumbura.

From the beginning of the Congolese rebellion in the east in the spring of 1964 until the downfall of the Nyamoya government in January 1965 and the ouster of the Chinese Communist diplomatic mission, Burundi was a center of prorebel sentiment and support. Leading members of the government, amply financed by the Chinese, gave the rebels sanctuary and diplomatic support and worked hard to further the rebel cause. Since that time, Burundi has been a state of internal flux. While the Burundi King and leaders of the majority Hutu tribe have sought to reorient Burundi to a pro-Western policy and to reverse Burundi's involvement with the Congolese rebels, the situation has not yet settled. The radical followers of Nyamoya continue to work for a return to power and the re-establishment of their previous policy. Currently, this internal struggle between moderates and radicals is being fought out in preparations for new parliamentary elections scheduled for 10 May. It seems likely at this point that the governing UPRONA party will be returned overwhelmingly, but whether the moderates will be able to establish themselves strongly in the assembly and firmly in control of the UPRONA remains uncertain.

While the moderate Hutus through sheer numbers appear the most likely to win over the long term, the short-term advantage clearly lies with the radical Tutsis. They are the traditional ruling people, they are the best educated and organized, and they have the support of the radical African states. It seems almost certain that the supporters of the Congolese rebels--the radical Africans, the Communists--who are hard pressed to open new routes to the Congo, are supporting the Tutsis.

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The radical African states might, in the event the radicals do not re-establish themselves by legal means, support them in an illegal takeover. In any event, Tanzanian leader Nyerere, if he chose, could exert strong economic pressures on Burundi to force it to conform.

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
7 April 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Tanzanian Support For
The Congo Rebels

Summary

1. In retrospect, it is clear that Tanzania has been actively aiding the Congolese rebels at least since September of last year--well before the main radical African effort was organized. Tanzania has passed on Chinese and Soviet-supplied arms, apparently has provided training and facilities for Congolese insurgents, and has given the rebellion strong political support.

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[REDACTED] NOW that easy access to the rebels through Uganda and the Sudan has been cut off, the Dar es Salaam - Kigoma arms route may be the last hope for the rebel cause.

The Decision to Aid the Rebels

2. Tanzanians have been associated with the current rebellion in the eastern Congo at least since May 1964. It is unclear, however, whether aid to the rebels had Nyerere's sanction until July, when Tshombé came to power in Leopoldville. Nyerere and other Tanzanian leaders have long despised Tshombé, whom they consider a colonial puppet. Their sympathies since 1960 have been with Lumumba and his successors. In April 1961 the Tanganyikan minister of home affairs admitted publicly that goods were transitting Dar es Salaam for the "legitimate" Gizenga government in Stanleyville, and that goods for Tshombé then in Katanga were not being allowed through because "he is not recognized by anybody."

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Tanzania and the Radical Africans

7. As far as can be determined, Tanzania was the first African state to facilitate deliveries of material aid to the Congolese rebels. Other radical Africans were to follow Tanzania's lead. A co-ordinated radical program to overthrow Tshombé apparently was initiated in early October during the conference of nonaligned states held in Cairo, when a consortium was formed, which was eventually to include Egypt, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, the Sudan, and Congo (Brazzaville), as well as the three East African states.

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8. Since that time, Tanzania has participated in several meetings concerning the Congo rebellion. The first, held at Dar on 16 October, was attended by Nyerere, Kenya's President Kenyatta, Uganda's Prime Minister Obote, Zambia's President Kaunda, and the radical Burundi Prime Minister Nyamoya

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10. Other top-level meetings involving Tanzania and concerning aid to the Congo rebels occurred on 18 November, 23 December, and 13 January. Following the last, which was held in Mbale, Uganda, and was attended by Gbenye, Nyerere publicly extolled the rebel leader, saying that Gbenye was "as responsible as any African leader that I have met...committed to the same objectives of African freedom and African dignity...as everyone else is."

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11. [REDACTED]

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Tanzanian leaders have been in the vanguard of those urging greater support for the rebels. Kambona recently reaffirmed Tanzanian solidarity with the insurgents and intimated that the struggle in the Congo may take "ten years."

Arms Deliveries and Smuggling Routes

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15. Most rebel-bound arms reach Kigoma by railroad. There is evidence that some are trucked from the port at Dar to a loading station at least 100 miles west, apparently to avoid observation. [REDACTED]

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19. For some time Communist-made arms have been seized around the periphery of the Fizi salient, but detailed descriptions are lacking because of limited US access to the area. An AP news correspondent, however, observed in late March that a Congolese battalion southwest of Fizi was armed with captured Czech rifles and ammunition. On 23 January, mercenaries north of Fizi captured a 120-mm. mortar [redacted]

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[redacted] and several drums of potassium chloride and acid (used for making Molotov cocktails) marked "Tanganyika."

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Training and "Volunteers"

20. Reports of training of Congolese rebels have come in since last fall, but they are difficult to substantiate because of the security restrictions around Kigoma. (For example, in mid-March a former CBS correspondent, travelling by lake steamer from Bujumbura to Albertville, was seized by Tanzanian security officials when he stepped ashore at Kigoma. Shortly thereafter Congolese rebels were permitted to search the vessel for pro-Tshombé Congolese.)

21. Estimates of the number of Congolese insurgents trained in Tanzania range as high as 3,000.

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22. Information concerning Tanzanian "volunteers" serving with the Congolese rebels is likewise vague. Tanzanians were reported in the Congo south of Bukavu last May, but their presence has never been confirmed.

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Prospects

23. Now that the rebellion in the northeast appears to be crumbling, in part because of the interdiction of the Sudanese and Ugandan arms routes, pressure to use the Tanzanian route is likely to grow. Since early March, in fact, the use of the Dar-Kigoma route appears to have increased. Rail traffic is said to be heavy, and a restricted air corridor has been established from Kigoma in the direction of Dar. The Kigoma airstrip apparently is to be extended.

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24. Tanzanian efforts to supply the rebels may be frustrated, however. In early March the Congolese Government mounted a lake patrol--now consisting of eight vessels--and several suspect smuggling boats have been sunk. Also, access through Burundi continues to be denied and Congolese troops still hold Uvira, astride the main road between Burundi and the Congo.

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